Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2020

Public Health Law Tools: A Brief Guide
Kristen Underhill
Columbia Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Kristen Underhill, Public Health Law Tools: A Brief Guide, LAW IN THE TIME OF COVID-19, KATHARINA PISTOR
(ED.), COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, 2020 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2800

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Public Health Law Tools: A Brief Guide
Kristen Underhill, Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School

The COVID-19 pandemic offers a threat with few precedents in modern times and tests the tools
of modern surveillance and public health law. The goal of this chapter is to provide a brief
overview of the types of measures that state and federal governments can invoke to treat and
prevent the spread of infectious disease. The following sections will provide an orientation to
domestic public health law followed by the types of measures available to state and federal public
health authorities.
Although this chapter does not consider international institutions, treaties, or norms that affect
public health, these are also essential to the overall pandemic response. (See here for a helpful
overview of the structure of global health law.)

Old and New Public Health Law
Public health law is sometimes divided into “old public health” and “new public health.” Old
public health law refers to the classic functions of government to limit the transmission of
infectious disease and environmental hazards: these are measures like quarantines, vaccination,
public sanitation, and food safety. These government policies pose “tragedy of the commons”
issues: they require collective action or infrastructure that is unlikely or impossible without
central coordination. COVID-19 and the person-to-person spread of the virus that causes it
(SARS-Cov-2) meet this definition precisely. For any given individual, the costs of protective
measures (like quarantine or self-isolation) may be greater than the risks posed by continuing
ordinary life. But for the population as a whole, continuing life as usual will result in a large
number of infections and/or deaths. As we have learned from past epidemics, these infections
and deaths are often more concentrated in groups with preexisting vulnerabilities, including
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people who are poor, ill, disabled, elderly, experiencing discrimination, or living in communities
with poor infrastructure.
By contrast, “new” public health refers to governmental efforts to reduce risk factors leading to
morbidity and mortality that are not infectious or transmitted by environmental hazards. Those
risk factors include mental health problems, substance use disorders, and chronic
noncommunicable conditions such as heart disease and cancer. These human problems may also
benefit from centralized coordination, particularly in addressing social determinants of health
(e.g., socioeconomic inequality). But “new” public health problems have more complex causes,
and although government action can influence predictors of chronic and noncommunicable
disease, these efforts are different in kind from efforts to limit agents of infectious or
environmental disease.
Government policies that address “old” public health threats can be broad and sometimes
coercive, including invasive interventions into daily life. But these actions rest on a solid
foundation of case law that recognizes the unique capacity of government—particularly state
government—to play a coordinating role in times when individual actions pose society-wide risks.
Where there is a visceral threat to society as a whole, governments have wide latitude to protect
the population. By contrast, efforts to address “new” public health problems tend to be
perceived as less urgent and therefore draw greater opposition on the basis of personal
autonomy. In the US context, some people also perceive new public health problems to be
caused by irresponsible individual behaviors (e.g., lack of exercise or alcohol use) instead of being
driven social determinants. This view tends to characterize government actions as paternalistic
and detrimental to personal responsibility, and so appeals to solidarity may be less effective than
in the infectious disease context.

Public Health Law Interventions in the US
In the US legal system, states have primary authority to address infectious public health threats
as part of what is known as the “police power”—plenary authority to provide for the well-being
of state citizens. The federal government can also address infectious disease but within a more
60

limited remit of actions that affect interstate commerce and/or the spread to the United States
of infections transferred from other nations.

The federal government, for example, can

quarantine and test international travelers (including US citizens; see here for a sample
quarantine order) and goods, limit entry by sea at US ports, bar air travel by infected people, and
bar noncitizens from entering the country. The federal government has authority, through the
Surgeon General, to “make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary” to
prevent the interstate spread of infectious diseases (including testing people “reasonably
believed to be infected” and isolating people actually infected). An executive order specifies the
infections that qualify for federal quarantine; these include “severe acute respiratory
syndromes” and the virus causing COVID-19. Federal quarantine authority has been used rarely,
however, as the threat of infectious disease declined and as the federal government invested
fewer resources in enforcement throughout the 20th century. The most recent use of widespread
federal isolation and quarantine measures was during the Spanish flu pandemic a century ago.
Restrictions at the federal level are more tenuous when applied to activities and corporations
that act only in one state.

In modern practice, the federal government assumes broad

responsibility for limiting the risks of infection spread by the international movement of goods
and people while states take the lead in responding to threats internal to the US.
This division of responsibility explains why infectious disease responses like vaccination and
quarantine mandates are set by states (and, in some states, county or municipal governments),
and why the US response to COVID-19 has varied so much across state lines. There are
nonetheless many actions available to the federal government in pandemic times. These include
providing services, funds, expertise, equipment, and resources (including, for example,
compulsory licensing of patented drugs or requiring businesses to accept contracts to produce
goods such as masks and ventilators); purchasing and distributing essential goods; enforcing laws
that prohibit epidemic responses that discriminate against protected groups; enforcing statutes
that bar hoarding or price gouging of designated goods; supporting surveillance and research;
supporting the enforcement of state-ordered quarantines; coordinating state actions; providing
direct messaging to the public; and taking actions that affect national markets and the social
safety net. Federal actions that respond to COVID-19 are collated here.
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State governments have a number of tools to reduce the transmission of infectious disease and
they have used many of these during the COVID-19 epidemic. State power is at its strongest in
laws that seek to protect public health against serious contagious disease. When state authorities
reasonably believe that there is a threat of disease, courts tend to uphold state actions that are
not shown to be abusive, in bad faith, or a pretext for discrimination. This is true even when
state actions are later found to be erroneous. Individual health officers, members of state and
local boards of health, and municipalities themselves are not liable for errors of judgment as long
as they act in good faith and take only the actions within their authority.
In some states, state legislation has delegated authority to local governments to take some or all
of these actions—culminating in a national response that involves the participation of more than
2,600 state, local, and tribal authorities. The need to coordinate these governmental units can
severely complicate the rapid response needed to contain a fast-moving epidemic, as COVID-19
has illustrated.
The following public health measures are available at the state level for an infectious disease
response, and many are used continuously for the monitoring and control of endemic infectious
diseases.
State Spending and Legislation. States can (and must) spend funds or forgo income to support
the response to an epidemic, including direct financing of public insurance, public health
surveillance activities, grants to public and private hospitals and clinics, and the purchase of
equipment (e.g., ventilators and masks). State efforts to shore up public safety nets, including
health insurance coverage, nutritional assistance, unemployment benefits, and housing
assistance also require public spending and may be an essential part of enabling people to comply
safely with more restrictive measures such as quarantines. State legislation can also reduce
individuals’ exposure to the financial costs of the epidemic by requiring health insurance
coverage for infection-related expense. These actions apply to insurance plans that are not
subject to federal regulation under the Affordable Care Act. Lifting sanctions for criminal laws
can also enable fuller compliance by populations who may fear contact with governmental
institutions.
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State Public Health Activities. State and municipal departments of public health conduct
essential activities directly. These include providing centralized counts of infections and tracking
of infection spread, engaging in contact tracing, notifying people who may have been exposed,
and enforcing more invasive measures such as vaccination requirements and quarantines. These
activities demand increased resources during pandemics, requiring further spending, borrowing,
and perhaps taxing by states and cities.
State Speech and Regulation of Speech. States always have authority to warn and educate the
public directly about infectious disease, modes of transmission, and preventive measures. States
in pandemic times may also consider measures such as restricting erroneous or dangerous
speech (e.g., prosecuting hoaxes and fraudulent claims about possible cures), or requiring speech
by private parties (e.g., mandating posted warnings in hospitals or grocery stores). Any speech
restrictions or compulsory speech are subject to constitutional limitations.
State Regulation and Control of the Built Environment. States can use the levers of licenses,
permits, zoning laws, and building codes to require structural changes that may be needed to
reduce infectious disease. States and cities can also make some changes to the environment
directly, such as practices for cleaning, opening, and maintaining public facilities (e.g., transit
systems, schools, parks, and public buildings).
State Courts. State court systems can also shape some areas of pandemic response such as by
providing a functioning tort system that shapes medical practice (e.g., through medical
malpractice claims that recognize standards of care), consumer protection (e.g., through
products liability law and penalties for fraud and misrepresentation), and sometimes the direct
transmission of infection (e.g., through tort penalties for people who negligently or purposely
expose others to infectious disease). The tort system is slow-moving and relies on litigation by
private parties, making it a cumbersome tool for the rapid response needed in a pandemic.
Courts also provide a forum for individuals or groups to challenge public health regulations that
are burdensome to individuals or corporations or that may be designed or implemented in a way
that discriminates against protected classes. Lawsuits alleging that states have overstepped in
their response to COVID-19 are already underway. Under some state laws, courts must issue
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emergency orders to allow other uses of state power, such as quarantines. Courts are also central
to modifying terms or conditions of imprisonment in order to lessen the threats of infectious
disease in detention settings.
State Regulation of Individuals. In pandemic times, state and local actions that exert direct
control over individuals and corporations are highly visible. States continuously and quietly
engage in many of these actions in non-epidemic times, including the surveillance of infectious
and chronic disease rates, enforcing mandates for screening and testing (e.g., mandatory testing
in detention facilities), providing for (or sometimes mandating) the treatment of infectious
diseases (e.g., tuberculosis), setting and enforcing vaccine schedules, tracing contacts and
notifying possibly exposed persons, inspecting premises (e.g., restaurants), and enforcing other
criminal and civil laws intended to minimize the spread of infectious disease (e.g., public nuisance
laws). But in pandemic times, the use of more coercive measures can escalate, including business
closures, social distancing and travel restrictions, limitations on gatherings (as long as such bans
are content-neutral), curfews, quarantines for people visiting from out of state, isolation orders
for infected individuals, and vaccination mandates. With the exception of vaccination (as no
vaccine is yet available), a majority of states have now enacted some or all of these measures to
respond to COVID-19. Although states may retain authority to create sanitary cordons—isolated
geographic zones with bars on entry and exit—states have not yet taken this measure in the
current pandemic.
All of these state approaches are bounded by the limits of the federal constitution as well as by
the constitutions of individual states. Where states reasonably believe that there is a serious
public health threat, however, courts tend to be deferential, as the state’s interest in public
health tends to outweigh individual freedoms. Penalties for individual violations of these
mandates may include civil fines, criminal fines, or jail time, as long as these penalties are
permitted under state legislation and set in advance. But notably, criminalization of infectious
disease exposure (even intentional exposure) may undermine other state efforts to control
infection (e.g., contact tracing, testing, and treatment), which may be illustrated by state efforts
since the 1980s to criminalize HIV exposure. Several federal and state efforts to prosecute
individuals for intentional coronavirus exposure are underway using charges such as assault, and
64

the federal government may prosecute these offenses under anti-terrorism laws (e.g., use of
weapons of mass destruction).

Quarantine, Isolation, and Social Distancing
State laws enabling quarantines, isolation, and social distancing measures have been significant
in the COVID-19 response. State quarantine laws vary greatly along lines such as the duration
and location of quarantine, enforcement penalties, application to individuals and/or groups,
additional authorities available after emergency declarations, and availability of administrative
review. State quarantine laws are collated and searchable here.
Although quarantines, isolation, and other social distancing measures can interfere with many
rights—including freedom of assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of contract, and the right
to travel—courts usually find that states’ interest in public health outweighs these freedoms. As
a result, social distancing orders are usually upheld as long as they are reasonable in relation to
the threat to public health. Judicial decisions in New Jersey and Maine pertaining to the same
individual during the 2014 Ebola epidemic illustrate the court approaches. Although quarantines
must not be a pretext for discrimination against any protected class, religious exemptions are not
required. In order for quarantine regulations to survive judicial review, authorities must
reasonably believe that the public is in danger of an epidemic and that quarantined people have
been exposed; mere suspicion of infection or exposure is insufficient. Courts also agree that
some procedural due process is needed; hearings, however, are usually limited to the question
of whether authorities were reasonable in their belief that a quarantine was needed. State
statutes structure the ways in which quarantines are enforced and federal law specifies that state
and federal governments may (and should) support each other in quarantine enforcement.

Vaccination Laws
Although no vaccine is yet available for SARS-CoV-2, states’ authority to mandate vaccination
may apply to the COVID-19 response in the future. Should a vaccine be developed, states could
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permissibly require individuals to receive the vaccine (enforceable by fines or even compulsorily
required), as long as there are exemptions for people who are medically unable to be vaccinated.
Multiple courts have found that Religious exemptions from state vaccination mandates are not
required by the 14th Amendment. Courts are also wary of second-guessing state legislatures’
belief that vaccination is sufficiently safe and needed as part of a pandemic response.

Emergency Declarations
Emergency declarations at the state and federal levels can allow states to access additional
resources. Those declarations also expand the powers granted to the executive branch in times
of a pandemic. The goal of such declarations—enabled by more than 100 federal laws—is to
enable a nimbler and faster response to changing conditions without requiring the more
cumbersome machinery of the legislature and courts. The White House and all 50 state
governors have now declared COVID-19 to be a public health emergency and the White House
has deemed it both a public health emergency under the Public Health Service Act and a “major
disaster” qualifying under the terms of the Stafford Act.
Federal emergency preparations (see here and here for overviews) changed dramatically in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks and the anthrax exposures in 2001 and subsequent legislation included
the Federal Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
(which established the National Disaster Medical System and the Strategic National Stockpile of
medical supplies); the Project BioShield Act of 2004 (which allows the FDA to issue emergency
use authorizations for drugs and devices); amendments to the Stafford Act; the National
Emergencies Act; the Public Health Service Act, and the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act (PAHPA). The Stafford Act declaration enables the Federal Emergency Management Agency
to coordinate the national response to COVID-19 in affected states that request support and to
certify that the emergency has overwhelmed state capacity. Each of these declarations enables
federal executive actions that ease constraints on public health insurance (e.g., Medicaid § 1135
waivers or waivers of obligations under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
or HIPA), allow additional expenditures, grant increased authority to enact quarantines, alleviate
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tort liability for products and persons involved in the response, and provide for the reallocation
of resources and personnel. Federal emergency powers under the Defense Production Act also
give the executive branch the authority to take control of industries and to require contractors
to prioritize federal contracts. The federal government response to the COVID-19 epidemic has
lagged but is increasingly scaling up to use these authorities. Congress can also grant agencies
more powers in times of crisis (see, for example, the request by the Department of Justice for
authority to extend statutes of limitation and detention periods for defendants with delayed
trials).
States have their own emergency statutes, and a number of states adopted versions of the Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) after its drafting in 2001. State definitions of
emergency vary, with many states leaving the term undefined, but most states require an exigent
situation, potential calamitous harm, and an inability to avoid the harm through ordinary
measures. At the state level, declarations of a state emergency expand the powers of governors,
health officers, and boards of health. These powers vary, but generally include the power to
quarantine exposed people, isolate or treat infected people, vaccinate against infectious disease,
institute distancing measures, ease licensure restrictions on clinicians from other states, educate
the public, spend state funds, and engage in takings. (For a useful overview of state and federal
emergency powers, see here.)
The expansive grants of federal and state executive power during emergencies can raise concerns
that agencies, governors, or the President will misuse these temporary authorities to enact policy
changes that were impermissible in normal times. But as the Congressional response to COVID19 has shown, legislative action can also be too slow and unwieldy in times of crisis. Federal
coordination is essential for responding to epidemics that cross domestic and international
borders and that outmatch states’ resources to respond. The COVID-19 emergency is one such
epidemic, and both federal and state efforts will be crucial for an effective and durable response.
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Additional Resources
General public health law related to COVID-19:
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200319.757883/full/
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2764283
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMra1314094
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/ncsl-coronavirus-covid-19-resources.aspx
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2006740

Emergency law:
https://www.train.org/cdctrain/training_plan/4120
https://law.emory.edu/elj/content/volume-67/issue-3/index.html
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/public-health-chart.aspx

CDC and NIH resources:
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/pdf/Public-Health-Order_Generic_FINAL_02-13-2020-p.pdf
https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/specificlawsregulations.html

Resources on state law:
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-quarantine-and-isolation-statutes.aspx
https://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/Public-health-emergency.aspx
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https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Courthouse%20Facilities/State-LawPandemic-Response.ashx
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/state-data-and-policy-actions-to-addresscoronavirus/

Resources on quarantine law:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3157182
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/coronavirus-quarantine-america-couldbe-giant-legal-mess/606595/
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8852098/vanderhook2.html?sequence=4
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5886825/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6687239/

69

70

